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This article reviews the impact of globalization on democracy in
Africa. It sees globalization, which has largely taken the shape of
neoliberalism, as leading to the development of a minimalist conception
of democracy in African countries. Further, this article contends that
administrative law norms, which are increasingly embraced in
Constitutions and judicial decisions world over, can be useful
instruments for deepening democracy in Africa. That is, the
establishment and implementation of elaborate regimes of
administrative law (containing principles, procedures, and remedies that
circumscribe the exercise of both public and private power) can
contribute to the realization of democratic governance in African
countries. This article then demonstrates how administrative law can
subject the exercise of power to the rule of law, contribute to the
realization of social and economic rights, enhance public participation in
governance, and contribute to the democratization of the exercise of
power within legislatures and judiciaries.
INTRODUCTION
It is fair to say that globalization, which has been defined as the
intensification of the process of international interdependence,' has
*Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Nairobi.
1. See, e.g., David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (2008) (defining globalization as "a process by which
'technological, economic, and political innovations . . . have drastically reduced the
barriers to economic, political and cultural exchange,' resulting in not only 'increasing
transnational flows and increasingly thick networks of interdependence,' but also an
expansion of the 'scale on which power is organized and exercised."') (citations omitted).
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contributed to the growth of democracy in Africa in the last two decades.
Here, the ideology of neoliberalism espoused by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in their structural adjustment
programs (SAPs) has been the main instrument of globalization.
Through SAPs, which were introduced in the early 1980s, African
countries were told that they could only enhance their development by
increasing the role of the market in their economies. The ensuing
marketization process mandated reducing the size of the public sector,
including privatizing public enterprises, and removing government
regulations and controls.2
A decade or so after the inception of SAPs, however, it became quite
clear that the objectives of the neoliberal market reforms would not be
realized in the absence of complementary political reforms. Market
reforms invariably ran up against determined political resistance, as
they constituted a threat to the authoritarian regimes that profited from
the status quo and, in particular, sought to maintain public enterprises
as sources of patronage resources. 3 Hence, a consensus emerged among
Africa's reformers and the Bretton Woods Institutions during the late
1980s and the early 1990s that market reforms could only be
implemented "by establishing mechanisms of accountability and
subjecting governmental operations to public scrutiny."4 It was hoped
that the transition to multiparty democracy would enable Africans to
"scrutinize the performance of their governments and change [them] if
necessary."5 Accordingly, the World Bank and the IMF began to
condition aid on the adoption of programs for both political and
economic adjustment. The political adjustment programs were later
subsumed under the rubric "good governance." Indeed, many
commentators considered the adoption of multiparty democracy and
economic reforms in the early 1990s to be heralds of Africa's
renaissance. Such was the optimism that the two policies were dubbed
"[t]he twin pillars of [Africa's] second liberation."6
2. See, e.g., E. A. Brett, States, Markets and Private Power: Problems and Possibilities,
in PRIVATISATION IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 47, 49 (Paul Cook & Colin Kirkpatrick
eds., 1988) ("[T]he interventions of the World Bank and the IMF, produced overwhelming
pressures to reduce the role of the state and to sell loss-making public corporations into
the private sector where it was assumed that they would be rehabilitated by being
subjected to the discipline of the market.").
3. See Joel D. Barkan, Divergence and Convergence in Kenya and Tanzania: Pressures
for Reform, in BEYOND CAPITALISM VS. SOCIALISM IN KENYA AND TANZANIA 1, 1-2 (Joel D.
Barkan ed., 1994).
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id.
6. Id at 1.
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Democratization, which largely took the form of constitutional
reform and the introduction of multiparty democracy, therefore became
a key agenda of neoliberalism. Since 1990, these democratization
initiatives have led to significant political reforms in many African
countries. Key achievements of these initiatives have included: the
reintroduction of multiparty politics, the introduction and sustenance of
presidential term limits, the institution of regular and competitive
elections for legislative and presidential office, the liberation of
legislatures and judiciaries from the shackles of the executive, and the
emergence and growth of an assertive private media and civil society.
Further, if the respect of presidential term limits is taken as an
indicator of adherence to the rule of law, then it follows that
constitutional rules are increasingly taken more seriously. Accordingly,
Africa's democracy picture is beginning to look decent and presentable.
Compared to 1990, when just three countries could be called
democracies, Freedom House reports that Africa is now home to
twenty-four democracies. 7 In addition, the African public is increasingly
demanding and appreciating democracy; it perceives democracy in
terms of protecting civil liberties, participating in decision-making,
voting in elections, and implementing governance reforms. In this
respect, it is encouraging that technological changes, such as the
proliferation of mobile phones, have made citizens more aware of civic
matters.8
However, various critics have questioned the nature of the
democracy that African countries have adopted as a result of the above
global processes. Nqosa L. Mahao, for example, argues that "neo-liberal
globalisation has consciously crafted a minimalist concept of
democracy," which "provides for elected government ... [but] constrains
and emasculates participatory democracy, the centrality of social justice
in the mission of the state and state sovereignty."9 As we shall see,
Africa's privatization experience supports this view. 10
Further, although neoliberal globalization has played a central part
in advancing multipartyism in Africa, it may have also "actively
imped[ed] further democratization."'1 For example, Stephen Brown has
7. Larry Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Big Man, 19 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 139
(2008).
8. See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Liberation Technology, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 69 (2010).
9. See, e.g., Nqosa L. Mahao, The Constitutional State in the Developing World in the
Age of Globalisation: From Limited Government to Minimum Democracy, 12 LAW,
DEMOCRACY & DEV., no. 2, 2008 at 1, 2 (emphasis added).
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. Stephen Brown, Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How
Foreign Donors Help to Keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in Power, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 725,
725 (2001).
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argued that, in Kenya,"[d]onors twice knowingly endorsed unfair
elections (including suppressing evidence of their illegitimacy) and
repeatedly undermined domestic efforts to secure far-reaching political
reforms."12 In his view, donors acted in this manner because their
"primary concern appeared to be the avoidance of any path that could
lead to a breakdown of the political and economic order, even if this
meant legitimising and prolonging the regime's authoritarian rule."13
Similarly, in Uganda in the 1990s, the World Bank ignored corrupt
practices because it was more concerned with achieving progress in
"privatization and other areas of structural adjustment."14 In addition,
Graham Harrison has observed that donors have tended to downplay
the corrupt practices of recipient governments since dealing with them
would disrupt the postconditionality regime.15 Therefore, it appears that
the World Bank has primarily been interested in the continuation of its
programs even when they may have undermined the public interest of
attaining democratic governance.
Accordingly, the democracy espoused in Africa today is largely
narrow or minimalist, and is primarily attached to the ballot box; but
democracy should be a daily practice rather than a periodic event. Since
the right to be consulted when political decisions or choices are being
made is a core component of democracy, democratization initiatives will
remain hollow if they are not accompanied by mechanisms that enable
citizens to participate meaningfully in the daily practices of governance.
In particular, because periodic elections do not offer the electorate an
adequate degree of control over government, there is a need for
auxiliary political and legal mechanisms to ensure not only the
day-to-day participation by citizens in governance, but also the political
accountability of the agents and instruments of governance. In other
words, there is a need to deepen the ways in which ordinary Africans
can effectively participate in and influence policies and governmental
actions that impact their lives. This is particularly the case given that
much of the work of government has been, and continues to be,
delegated to various public and private agencies thanks to neoliberal
globalization. In addition, a number of transnational organizations,
such as those regulating international sports, now exercise immense
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Roger Tangri & Andrew Mwenda, Corruption and Cronyism in Uganda's
Privatization in the 1990s, 100 AFR. AFF. 117, 130 (2001).
15. GRAHAM HARRISON, THE WORLD BANK AND AFRICA: THE CONSTRUCTION OF
GOVERNANCE STATES 71 (2004) (describing the post-conditionality regime as one in which
the donors no longer police reforms through the threat of freezing or withdrawing aid, but
instead negotiate for reforms through partnership and participation).
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power that threatens or violates the liberties of individuals. A need also
exists to regulate the power of these bodies.
Fortunately, many developed and developing countries have
increasingly turned to administrative law as an instrument for
deepening democracy. These countries have embraced administrative
law norms such as legality, reasonableness, procedural fairness, and
proportionality. They have also undertaken the duty to fulfill legitimate
expectations as a mechanism for regulating the exercise of public, and
even private, power. Arguably, the acceptance of these principles, which
are recognized in many Constitutions and embraced in judicial
decisions, constitutes the globalization of administrative law. This
process is buttressed by the enactment of statutes that establish sets of
minimum standards that governmental agencies must meet to ensure
that their decisions and actions are procedurally fair. 16 Further, many
countries have established ombudsmen to investigate individual
complaints of maladministration, correct errors and impropriety in such
cases, and provide remedies to aggrieved citizens. Another encouraging
development is that a number of jurisdictions have embraced novel
remedies, such as the structural interdict, which ensure that judicial
review contributes meaningfully to the realization of administrative
justice. 17
This article contends that administrative law can be a useful
instrument for deepening democracy in Africa. That is, the
establishment and implementation of elaborate regimes of
administrative law (containing principles, procedures, and remedies
that circumscribe the exercise of both public and private power) promise
to contribute to the realization of democratic governance in African
countries. Although administrative law is already impacting the
exercise of power in countries such as South Africa, it needs to be
accelerated in other African countries through administrative law
reform. Part I provides a conceptual framework and examines
globalization from the viewpoint of democracy and the rule of law. Part
16. See, e.g., Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Austl.); Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (S. Afr.); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
500-596 (1946).
17. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MBAZIRA, LITIGATING SOCIo-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH
AFRICA: A CHOICE BETWEEN CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (2009). The
structural interdict is in order of the court requiring the person to whom it is directed to
do or refrain from doing a particular thing. In the context of the enforcement of social
economic rights, it is often directed to government agencies and requires them to take
positive steps to remedy a wrongful state of affairs for which they are responsible, for
example, failing to give a hearing to persons affected by their decisions. Further, the court
retains jurisdiction after issuing the interdict so that it can supervise the implementation
of its orders.
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II considers how administrative law can enhance the quality of
democracy in Africa. It demonstrates how administrative law can
subject the exercise of power to the rule of law, contribute to the
realization of social and economic rights, enhance public participation in
governance, and contribute to the democratization of the exercise of
power within legislatures and judiciaries. Part III concludes.
I. GLOBALIZATION, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, AND DEMOCRACY
Globalization, especially its neoliberal variant, is typically presented
"as a value-free and inevitable force of modernisation."1s Neoliberalism
assumes that the operation of free markets will bring about a "natural
community of interests."1 9 In other words, the pursuit of one's own
advantage will eventually benefit everyone, although the resulting
benefits need not be distributed equally throughout society. Seeing
globalization as "transnational processes of market-oriented
governance," the dominant discourses limit discussion of this
phenomenon to the extraterritorial, thereby neglecting its interactions
with domestic political processes. 20
But this neglect of the domestic "indicts democratic rule" within the
nation-state. 21 Democracy is predicated on popular sovereignty, which
means "national political authorities are not only formally mandated to
make key decisions but are also accountable to the citizenry for them."22
However, globalization processes such as privatization undermine this
logic since they preclude "the exercise of real national sovereignty and
the implementation of truly democratic decisions by the people."23 That
is, these processes are producing a "democracy deficit," given that they
not only encourage forms of governance that involve new uses of the
private sector to achieve public ends, but also often bypass traditional
public accountability mechanisms. 24 As a result, globalization processes
are eroding "the capacity of elected governments to ... [make] decisions
18. Mahao, supra note 9, at 9-10.
19. Paul Williams & Ian Taylor, Neoliberalism and the Political Economy of the 'New'
South Africa, 5 NEW POL. ECON. 21, 22-24 (2000).
20. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization from the Ground Up: A Domestic Perspective, in
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME 2: LAW AND GOVERNANCE
3, 3 (Beverly Crawford ed., 2008).
21. Mahao, supra note 9, at 11.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative
Law: From Government to Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 379, 383 (2001).
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affecting their own citizens." 25 In any case, the technocratic agencies,
such as regulatory authorities making decisions on behalf of
governments, are often unaccountable. Furthermore, the public does not
usually participate meaningfully when public functions are outsourced
to the private sector, while vulnerable populations are often not
involved at all.26
In Africa, globalization processes have been blamed for exacerbating
poverty, thereby undermining the prospect that meaningful democracy
will be realized in the near future. Critics of privatization raise various
objections. First, they contend that privatization has led to layoffs and
worsening labor conditions. 27 Second, they argue that even where
privatization has enhanced enterprise efficiency, the bulk of its benefits
have accrued to a privileged few--owners of capital and the political
elite-while its costs have been borne by the majority such as
consumers and workers-thereby worsening their welfare. 28 Meaningful
democracy cannot be obtained in such unequal socio-economic contexts.
For this reason, socialist critiques of liberal theory have long
maintained that individual liberty involves having an opportunity for
self-realization, and even presupposes its achievement. 29 That is,
freedom should be positive in the sense of having the resources, powers,
or abilities needed for the achievement of self-realization. 30 The practice
of democracy may therefore require the constitutional recognition of
social and economic rights, and the imposition of a duty on the state to
facilitate their realization. When the state fulfills this obligation, it
contributes to the realization of economic equality and social justice,
without which there can be no positive freedom and, equally, no
meaningful democracy.
Therefore, a need arises to examine how globalization processes and
domestic politics interact, if only to enhance the democratic control of
the former. In Africa's case, this entails rethinking the minimalist
model of democracy adopted thus far, with a view to establishing modes
of direct democracy and other mechanisms that would give citizens
some meaningful control over globalization processes. In this respect,
Mahao takes the view that embedding cooperative governance, by which
he means "direct citizens' participation in government along with
25. Robin Luckham, Are There Alternatives to Liberal Democracy?, in THE DEMOCRATIC
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 306, 307 (Mark Robinson & Gordon White eds., 1998).
26. See Aman, supra note 20, at 15.
27. See, e.g., Sunita Kikeri & John Nellis, An Assessment of Privatization, 19 WORLD
RES. BANK OBSERVER 87 (2004).
28. See, e.g., ADJUSTMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE AND
PROMOTING GROWTH (Giovanni Andrea Cornia et al. eds., 1988).
29. See, e.g., JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISM 56 (2d ed. 1995).
30. See id. at 56-57.
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representative government," can enrich Africa's democratic project. 31
This would entail allowing citizens, by way of constitutional
prescriptions, to approve critical public issues through referenda. 32 He
gives the example of the South African Constitution, which establishes
"mechanisms of mandatory community or interest group consultations
on matters directly affecting them." 33
Administrative law can be useful in the quest for auxiliary
mechanisms of democratic control. Among other things, administrative
law regulates the exercise of power by requiring that all administrative
actions meet certain requirements of legality, reasonableness, and
procedural fairness. It performs this function by setting out general
principles and procedures that all administrators must follow and by
providing remedies for people affected by administrative action. In the
globalization context, scholars of administrative law have called for a
new approach to the regulation of power. 34
Although many jurisdictions have traditionally maintained a
public-private distinction, according to which only the exercise of public
power should be subjected to public law values, a new view is now
emerging. According to this new view, the exercise of power, whether
public or private, which affects vital interests, should comply with the
principles of fair or considerate decision-making. In this regard, Alfred
C. Aman, Jr. has argued that public-private partnerships should be
viewed as an extension of the state, since "the delegation of public
functions to private actors represents new ways for states to carry out
their responsibilities."35 From this perspective, markets constitute a
form of regulation, and "public law values . . .remain relevant, even
though private actors now carry out various tasks that can be
appropriately called governmental." 36 In his view, the challenge for
administrative law is to determine "how best to conceptualize
public-private relationships not only to assure fairness for those affected
by these decisions, but information that will enable [citizens] to assess
how best to determine whether these new arrangements are working
and are workable from a democratic point of view." 37
31. Mahao, supra note 9, at 15.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2003).
35. Aman, supra note 24, at 382.
36. Id.
37. Alfred C. Anan, Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in Globalization:
Making Markets More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1477, 1498 (2001).
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This emerging approach requires administrative law to expand the
democratic space by establishing institutional frameworks for the
participation of citizens in public decision-making. In this regard, Jody
Freeman has provided a useful framework for governmental regulation
of privatization processes. She argues that instead of seeing
privatization as a means of shrinking government, we should "imagine
it as a mechanism for expanding government's reach into realms
traditionally thought private. ' 38 She views privatization as "a means of
'publicization,' through which private actors increasingly commit
themselves to traditionally public goals as the price of access to
lucrative opportunities to deliver goods and services that might
otherwise be provided directly by the state."39 In practice, publicization
would include giving the citizenry third party rights in privatization
contracts. 40
Above all, the dominance of neoliberalism now requires
administrative law to confront private power. A core purpose of law is to
protect individuals and groups against the exercise of power, be it public
or private. While duties of considerate decision-making have been
imposed on public or governmental bodies in most common law
countries without much controversy and increasingly on private bodies
exercising public or governmental functions with fading resistance, 4 1 the
idea of imposing them on purely private bodies exercising de facto power
remains fiercely contested in many jurisdictions. Nevertheless, various
administrative law scholars have advocated the view that when a body,
whether public or private, wields "institutional power capable of
affecting rights and interests," it ought to be subject to judicial review.42
According to this enlightened view, in determining whether to extend
their supervisory jurisdiction to such private bodies, courts should look
into factors such as the nature of interests affected by their decisions,
how seriously their decisions impact those interests, "whether the
affected interests have any real choice but to submit to the bod[ies']
jurisdiction[s], and the nature of the context in which the bod[ies]
operate[] ."43
Arguing in favor of this progressive view in the English context,
Dawn Oliver asserts that there is now a "broad common law duty of
38. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285, 1285 (2003).
39. Id.
40. See id. at 1317.
41. See id. at 1289.
42. E.g., Murray Hunt, Constitutionalism and the Contractualisation of Government in
the United Kingdom, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 21, 32-33 (Michael
Taggart ed., 1997).
43. Id. at 32.
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considerate decision-making, the exact content of which will depend
upon the circumstances, but which spans the public/private divide."
44
The corollary of this duty is a "right of those seriously affected by
decisions taken by powerful bodies to have the effects of a decision upon
them considered and taken into account fairly and rationally before the
decision is made."45 In Oliver's view, "duties of fairness and rationality
in decision making" are common to both public and private law, and
their existence should not "depend upon the question whether the body
in question is public or private or performing public or governmental
functions." 46 This view is further supported by Sir Stephen Sedley, who
asserts, "the law's chief concern about the use of power is not who is
exercising it but what the power is and whom it affects."
47
Nevertheless, these scholars caution that the mere fact that a
private body possesses institutional power "should not lead inexorably
to the conclusion that all principles of a public law nature should be
equally applicable to such bodies."48
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA
In assessing whether administrative law can enhance the quality of
Africa's democracy, it is good to start by examining what role
administrative law could play in regulating globalization processes such
as privatization, and evaluate whether it has done so. If administrative
law is so critical to democratic governance, why has it not been
embraced by African countries? This entails an examination of the
history of administrative law in Africa. There have also been
encouraging developments that could enhance the future role of
administrative law in governance. These developments include the
constitutionalization and implementation of the right to fair
administrative action and social and economic rights in several
countries; and the establishment of institutions of horizontal
accountability such as ombudsmen, human rights bodies, and
anticorruption authorities. Another encouraging development is that
African legislatures and judiciaries are becoming institutions of genuine
44. Dawn Oliver, Common Values in Public and Private Law and the Public/Private
Divide, 1997 PUB. L. 630, 638.
45. Id.
46. DAWN OLIVER, COMMON VALUES AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE 89 (1999).
47. STEPHEN SEDLEY, Public Power and Private Power, in FREEDOM, LAW AND JUSTICE
19, 38 (1999).
48. Paul Craig, Public Law and Control over Private Power, in THE PROVINCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 42, at 196, 211.
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countervailing power, thanks to constitutional reforms. 49 However,
there are concerns of abuse of power within these institutions. Here too,
administrative law can contribute to the democratization of the exercise
of power, which will be necessary if these institutions are to play their
roles effectively and legitimately. Finally, there has been an emergence
of private power, which is primarily expressed in the context of
privatization, but can also be observed in other domains, such as sports.
Again, administrative law can contribute to the regulation of such
private power.
A. Public Law and Privatization in Africa 50
In democratic societies, the law should regulate both the power of
government to privatize, and the power that private entities acquire by
virtue of privatization processes. Law performs this critical function by
making sure that the exercise of power is democratic, in that it is
participatory and accountable. Unfortunately, policy-makers in Africa
have not paid sufficient attention to the role of law in regulating
privatization processes. This failure can be attributed to two political
economy practices, which have dictated the formulation and
implementation of neoliberal policies in Africa. These practices are
neopatrimonialism and development assistance. 51 Both tend to eschew
law and work to ensure that privatization continues to take place in a
context characterized by weak state institutions, including law. In
addition, both practices work to ensure that the state does not regulate
privatization processes in a democratic manner.
Neopatrimonialism refers to "a hybrid political regime in which
informal patron-client relationships both underlie and overshadow
legal-rational norms."52 This regime is undesirable since it abhors the
establishment of effective state institutions, as these would greatly
undermine the dispensation of clientelism and patronage. Informalism
is the rule of the game. Thus, while the state appears to possess "all the
trappings of a Weberian rational-legal system, with a clear distinction
between the public and the private[,] . . . this official order is constantly
49. See generally LEGISLATIVE POWER IN EMERGING AFRICAN DEMOCRACIES (Joel D.
Barkan ed., 2009) (documenting the emergence of legislatures in several African
countries).
50. See generally MIGAI AKECH, PRIVATIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN EAST AFRICA: THE
PROMISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2009).
51. Id. at 23-31.
52. Migai Akech, Constraining Government Power in Africa, 22 J. DEMOCRACY 96, 96
(2011). See also S. N. EISENSTADT, TRADITIONAL PATRIMONIALISM AND MODERN
NEOPATRIMONIALISM 13 (1973) (discussing the aspects of neopatrimonial regimes).
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subverted by a patrimonial logic, in which officeholders almost
systematically appropriate public resources for their own uses."
5 3
Therefore, in reality, the public sector in a neopatrimonial system is
appropriated by private interests and, as a result, there is widespread
"straddling between positions [and] practices of power and economic
accumulation. 54 Since the neopatrimonial system can only work where
the state apparatus is not properly or completely institutionalized,
ruling elites have an incentive to perpetuate the weakness of the state
apparatus. 55 Indeed, the ruling elites are often apprehensive about
strong institutionalization of the state apparatus because it may lead to
elements of the state bureaucracy developing their own independent
agendas, thereby threatening regime survival. 56 Further, while the
ruling elites may understand that "an efficient, independent (from
political pressure) and meritocratic state bureaucracy is needed to
implement national development policies," they are unlikely to create
such a bureaucracy since it "would be less pliable and politically reliable
and more likely to expose malfeasance." 57
Governance in African countries continues to be characterized by
widespread patrimonial penetration of the legal-rational bureaucracy,
which is in turn defined by grants of broad swaths of power that are not
sufficiently regulated by law. Further, the legal-rational domain itself is
not sufficiently participatory or accountable. This results in
legal-rational systems-with their already broad grants of power-that
are subject to penetration by patrimonial forces bent on self-serving
rather than public regarding outcomes. Neopatrimonialism also entails
the usurpation of public resources by political elites. The elites then
dispense these public resources as political patronage for purposes of
retaining political power. In my estimation, neopatrimonial
considerations have considerably influenced privatization processes in
African countries. Again, the World Bank and the IMF have typically
53. NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, AFRICAN ECONOMIES AND THE POLITICS OF PERMANENT
CRISIS, 1979-1999, at 51-52 (2001).
54. B6atrice Hibou, The 'Privatization' of the State: North Africa in Comparative
Perspective, in THE DYNAMICS OF STATES: THE FORMATION AND CRISES OF STATE
DOMINATION 71, 91 (Klaus Schlichte ed., 2005).
55. See PATRICK CHABAL & JEAN-PASCAL DALOz, AFRICA WORKS: DISORDER AS
POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 14 (1999).
56. See William Reno, The Privatisation of Sovereignty and the Survival of Weak
States, in PRIVATIZING THE STATE 95, 98 (B6atrice Hibou ed., Jonathan Derrick trans.,
2004).
57. Diana Cammack, The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What Role for Donors?,
25 DEV. POL'Y REV. 599, 601 (2007).
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insisted on the implementation of neoliberal reforms as a precondition
for the receipt of development assistance.58
Conversely, development assistance is troubling because it
undermines institution building, thereby reinforcing the neopatrimonial
tendencies of African governments. 591n the first place, the preference of
international development agencies such as the World Bank and the
IMF for quick, technocratic, but undemocratic decision-making in the
formulation and implementation of neoliberal policies (such as
privatization) has played into the hands of African governments, which
have been keen to maintain the flow of patronage resources. In the
absence of open and democratic institutional frameworks, privatization
initiatives have often benefited powerful state and economic elites at the
expense of the general public. For example, "Uganda's privatization in
the 1990s was marred by malpractices and manipulations involving
regime politicians and well-connected individuals. '"6° Accordingly,
governments in Africa have been assisted greatly by the lack of
democracy in the neoliberal reform process, which has allowed them to
manipulate the process to serve their narrow interests. As Roger Tangri
and Andrew Mwenda have observed, 'World Bank-designed divestiture
programmes in African countries often conferred wide discretion on
state elites, partly to quicken the pace of privatization and partly to
counter resistance to it."61 Oliver Campbell and Anita Bhatia confirm
this observation, noting that there was "pressure to proceed to privatize
and to deal with regulation afterward."62
These two practices have facilitated a culture of secrecy in the
formulation and implementation of privatization processes that are also
characterized by straddling-by internal and external actors-between
the public and private realms. In the area of security, for example,
clandestine power networks of African elites and private security and
military companies linked to multinational corporations have conspired
to exploit the continent's natural resources and the commercial
opportunities offered by the privatization of security. 63 Even where they
have cut down on military strengths, in keeping with the neoliberal
agenda, African political elites have, in some cases, established private
security groups to protect their regimes. These privatizations often take
58. See, e.g., JOHN DEGNBOL-MARTINUSSEN & PoUL ENGBERG-PEDERsON, AID:
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION (2003); John Brohman,
Universalism, Eurocentrism, and Ideological Bias in Development Studies: From
Modernisation to Neoliberalism, 16 THIRD WORLD Q. 121 (1995).
59. See VAN DE WALLE, supra note 53, at 59-60.
60. Tangri & Mwenda, supra note 14, at 117.
61. Id. at 132.
62. OLIVER CAMPBELL WHITE & ANITA BHATIA, PRIVATIZATION IN AFRICA 48 (1998).
63. See AKECH, supra note 50, at 93-103.
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place outside the law, and are prevalent in countries such as Angola,
Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Kenya.64
Another plausible explanation for the neglect of legal reform issues
has been the failure to acknowledge the legal consequences of the
acquisition of significant power by private bodies as a result of
privatization processes. In turn, this failure can be attributed to a
liberal mind-set, which mostly seeks to regulate public power and
largely considers private power to be benign. For example, public law in
common law countries is only designed to regulate the exercise of
"public power"-that is, the power of government-as opposed to
"private power." In these jurisdictions, the law's relationship with power
has largely been governed by the ideology of liberal theory, which
establishes a dichotomy between the public sphere and the private
sphere. On the one hand, liberal theory explicitly recognizes the
imbalances in power between public bodies and private individuals,
which is then seen to justify the imposition of "higher order duties" of
fair or considerate decision-making on public bodies.65 Conversely,
liberal theory does not sufficiently recognize power imbalances in the
private domain and largely assumes that individuals are equal and
capable of resolving any instances of abuses of private power among
themselves, without the need for governmental intervention. While
liberal theory has evolved over the years, culminating in the
establishment of the regulatory state in many developed countries,66
fidelity to the public-private dichotomy continues to be a hindrance to
the imposition of certain higher order duties on private bodies.
For example, the orthodox view is that constitutional rights "impose
constitutional duties . . . only on the government and not on private
actors."67 According to liberal theory, it is desirable to maintain "a
public-private division in the scope of constitutional rights, leaving the
private sphere free from constitutional regulation." 68 It is asserted that
this limitation of "the scope of constitutional rights to the public sphere
enhances the autonomy of citizens, preserving a heterogeneous private
sphere free from the uniform and compulsory regime constructed by
constitutional norms."69 The orthodox view is arguably inadequate in
today's globalizing world given that private bodies now wield significant
64. See id.
65. OLIVER, supra note 46, at 32.
66. See, e.g., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 11 (1990).
67. Stephen Gardbaum, The "Horizontal Effect" of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 387, 394 (2003).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 394-95.
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power. Fortunately, a horizontal approach to constitutional rights is
emerging, according to which "constitutional rights and values may be
threatened by extremely powerful private actors and institutions as well
as governmental ones."70 The horizontal approach criticizes the vertical
approach for "automatically privileg[ing] the autonomy and privacy of
such citizen-threateners over that of their victims."71
The fact that the state has chosen to privatize a service does not
relieve it of its obligations to its citizens. In this regard, it is useful to
examine privatization from the viewpoint of the human rights
obligations of the state. In particular, the development of a notion of
"positive obligations" in human rights discourse, which requires the
state to "respect, protect and fulfil" human rights, is particularly
encouraging.72 This concept expresses the idea that "the state [has] a
duty to take some positive action in order to ensure the effective
enjoyment" of human rights.73 Further, the obligations imposed on the
state by international human rights instruments include a duty to
ensure effective public participation in decision-making and effective
access to information. 74 Accordingly, the state is required to ensure
democratic governance if it is to meet its human rights obligations.
From this perspective, the state will meet its human rights obligations
by, among other things, establishing mechanisms that facilitate
effective public participation in privatization decision-making. Further,
the state will meet its human rights obligations by regulating the power
of private actors performing public functions.
Again, while economists and political scientists have written much
on the subject of privatization in African countries, 75 legal scholars have
not said much about its ramifications for democracy and
constitutionalism. The explanation for this dearth of legal analysis of
privatization lies in the fact that economists, whose concerns primarily
revolve around questions of economic efficiency, have dominated the
discourse on privatization. By and large, privatization has been
70. Id. at 395.
71. Id.
72. E.g., Silvia Borelli, Positive Obligations of States and the Protection of Human
Rights, 15 INTERIGHTS BULL. 101, 103 n.2 (2006).
73. Id. at 101.
74. See, e.g., Human Rights and Privatization, AMNESTY INT'L 5 (17 Mar. 2005),
http://www.amnesty.orgen/library/asset/POL34/003/2005/en/fe6b668d-d5Of-1 ldd-8a23-
d58a49c0d652/po1340032005en.
75. See, e.g., MERILEE S. GRINDLE, CHALLENGING THE STATE: CRISIS AND INNOVATION
IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA (1996); GRAHAM HARRISON, THE WORLD BANK AND AFRICA:
THE CONSTRUCTION OF GOVERNANCE STATES (2004); PRIVATISATION IN LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES (Paul Cook & Colin Kirkpatrick eds., 1988); PRIVATISING THE STATE (B6atrice
Hibou ed., 2004).
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perceived as an exclusive preserve of economic technocrats that does not
require public debate.
Due to these factors, insufficient attention has been paid to
privatization's implications for democracy and constitutionalism in
African countries. Yet privatization processes continue to distribute
societal resources and regulate the lives of citizens. Therefore, it
becomes important to ensure that political processes, such as
privatization decision-making, are subject to legal regulation. Although
administrative law could have helped in this endeavor, it is a tool that
has been neglected, partly because of the prevalence of wide
discretionary powers in the legal framework, and partly because of the
reluctance of judiciaries to hold the exercise of such power to account.
B. A Brief History of Administrative Law in Africa
Despite the potential of administrative law to facilitate the
democratic governance of globalization processes such as privatization,
it has not been given serious attention in common law African countries.
The explanation for this state of affairs is historical, and has much to do
with the colonial legacy of autocracy. 76 While these countries received
administrative law as part of the general statutes by which the British
imposed the common law on their African territories, the colonial
administration concentrated all power in the governor.77The received
administrative law was rendered irrelevant "both because the grants of
power to the governor were so broad as to confound the ultra vires rule,
and because the sorts of decisions with which he was charged were
largely 'executive' rather than 'quasi-judicial."' 78 The ultra vires rule
sought to ensure that public agencies to which power had been granted
did not exceed their powers as defined by the enabling acts of
Parliament.79 But where the enabling act of Parliament conferred very
broad powers to an agency, as tended to be the case in British colonies,
for example, defining the scope of an agency's powers was almost an
impossible task. English courts drew a distinction between
administrative and judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, an approach
that was followed in the colonies. The effect was that while the courts
were willing to, and often did, intervene to regulate the exercise of
power when an agency was engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial
76. See, e.g., MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND
THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (1996).
77. See Robert B. Seidman, Administrative Law and Legitimacy in Anglophonic Africa:
A Problem in the Reception of Foreign Law, 5 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 161, 175 (1970).
78. Id.
79. See P.P. CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (5th ed. 2003).
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proceedings, they were markedly reluctant to intervene in
administrative processes.80
As a result of these impediments, administrative law was rarely
invoked to curb the powers of the governor and public agencies, which
invariably were exercised through administrative proceedings.8 1 To
make matters worse, the enforcement of administrative law remedies
"depended upon private initiative through an adversary system."8 2
However, the African majority could not access these courts, due to the
duality of the colonial legal system that created a "civilized society"
defined by the "civilized" laws that regulated the affairs of the civilized
settler communities on the one hand, and a customary legal order that
regulated the affairs of the natives on the other hand.8 3 While "[t]he
former was organized on the principle of differentiation to check the
concentration of power, the latter [was organized] around the principle
of fusion to ensure a unitary authority."8 4 In essence, the African
majority had no rights in "civilized society," and was effectively
debarred from seeking administrative law remedies against colonial
maladministration.8 5
The inherited culture of autocracy still thrives today in these
countries, despite the prevalence of democratization initiatives. These
initiatives have tended to concentrate on enhancing ballot box
democracy and constitutional reform targeted at deconcentrating the
power of the executive by strengthening legislatures and judiciaries.
What these reform initiatives have failed to grasp, however, is the fact
that much of the power of government in African countries remains
uncircumscribed. That is, statutory laws and regulations typically grant
public officials broad powers without establishing effective procedural
mechanisms or limiting principles to circumscribe their exercise. H.
Kwasi Prempeh thus observes that "[1legislation ... still routinely gives
the African executive wide leeway ('as he thinks fit,' 'as he may
prescribe') in the everyday exercise of authority granted by statute."8 6
Africa's constitutional history also shows clearly that the culture of
autocracy, which has long been personified by the imperial presidency,
was carefully reconstructed as part of the reconstitution of the state by
political elites in the decade immediately following the attainment of
independence. "Between 1960 and 1962 [alone], thirteen newly
80. See id. at 10.
81. See Seidman, supra note 77, at 178.
82. Id. at 193.
83. See MAMDANI, supra note 76, at 16-23.
84. Id. at 18.
85. See id.
86. H. Kwasi Prempeh, Presidents Untamed, J. DEMOcRAcY, April 2008, at 109, 115.
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independent African states, beginning with [Nkrumah's] Ghana,
amended or replaced their independence constitutions" in favor of new
"rules of the game" that centralized public power in a unitary
president. 87 This reconstitution of the state was informed by an
instrumental view of law that saw the primary purpose of the
Constitution as facilitating state power, not controlling it.88 For
example, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania argued that Africa needed
Constitutions that would enable "the executive to function without
being checked at every turn."8 9 Therefore, according to these elites, law
"needed to be an accelerator, not a brake, to national development
goals." 90 Contrary to their expectations, the Constitutions that they
were "forced" to adopt by the departing colonial administrations had
fragmented power considerably, through mechanisms such as bicameral
legislatures, federalism or regionalism, separation of powers, judicial
review of legislative and executive action, and bills of rights which
created a framework for multi-party democracy, among other things.91
It should be noted that these political elites' instrumental view of
law was informed by "power realities" in the colonial state.92 Far from
being constrained by any notions of constitutionalism, the colonial state
was highly authoritarian, and "control and coercion . . . were the
hallmarks of the colonial legal order."93 Further, such control and
coercion were enabled by "instrumentalities of state power," which
consisted of statutory (as distinguished from constitutional) laws and a
'labyrinthine bureaucracy" through which colonial power and
administration was exercised. 94 This coercive legal order was
characterized by "a complex maze of highly structured and coercive
instruments" and "a degree of discretion that even courts sometimes
found difficult to circumscribe. '95
Africa's political elite quickly embraced this familiar legal order,
and in many ways reinforced it. Further, this legal order largely
remains intact in many African countries, despite decades of
democratization experiments. This may explain why careful observers of
87. H. Kwasi Prempeh, Africa's "Constitutionalism Revival" False Start or New
Dawn?, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 469, 474 (2007).
88. See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on
an African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN
THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65, 68 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).
89. Julius Nyerere, How Much Power for a Leader, 7 AFR. REP. 7 (1962).
90. Prempeh, supra note 87, at 480.
91. Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 88, at 70.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 69.
94. See id. at 69-71.
95. Id. at 77.
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African politics, such as Prempeh, are worried that the imperial
presidency has survived, despite the "precedent-setting changes to
Africa's political and constitutional landscape."96 Prempeh laments that
"Africa's current presidents may be term-limited, but by all accounts
they have not yet been tamed."97 Further, the president exercises
executive power through bureaucrats, which entails delegating broad
powers to the latter. As a result, bureaucrats regulate the daily lives of
citizens. The breadth and lack of effective regulation of these powers in
practice means that the bureaucrats often act as they wish. According to
Prempeh, for example, the typical citizen's encounter with bureaucrats
is "fraught with abuse of discretion, selective and ad hoc 'rule making,'
opportunistic delays, extortion, and frustration."9 8
A "credible regime of administrative law" can be useful in
preventing this rampant abuse of power.99  In this respect,
administrative law should be seen as a means for the realization of
day-to-day democracy, as it enables citizens to hold public agencies to
account in the periods between elections. Furthermore, the need for
suitable regimes of administrative law is now even more urgent given
the impact of globalization processes. Unless mechanisms are
established to ensure accountability to the public, these processes may
exacerbate the abuse of discretion that characterizes the exercise of
power in much of Africa. Indeed, empirical research indicates that many
Africans now acknowledge the limitations of ballot box democracy.10 0 In
particular, they "do not ... believe that elections have been particularly
effective at securing political accountability" and do not see any role for
themselves even "when it comes to asserting control over elected leaders
in the long intervals between elections."''1
C. Innovations in African Constitutionalism
Although the story of African constitutionalism has so far been
disappointing in some respects, there is reason to be cautiously
optimistic. This optimism is embodied in innovations such as the
constitutionalization of the rule of law; the right to fair administrative
96. Prempeh, supra note 86, at 110.
97. Id.
98. H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of
Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REv. 1239, 1302 (2005).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Michael Bratton & Carolyn Logan, Voters but not Yet Citizens: The Weak
Demand for Political Accountability in Africa's Unclaimed Democracies 2 (Afrobarometer,
Working Paper No. 63, 2006).
101. Id. at iv.
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action and social and economic rights; and the establishment of
institutions of horizontal accountability such as ombudsmen, human
rights bodies, and anti-corruption bodies. The South African
Constitutional Court is also leading the way in introducing novel
remedies such as the structural interdict, which facilitates the
implementation of constitutional prescriptions of social and economic
rights, thereby enhancing the prospects of realizing meaningful
democracy. Equally important, legislatures and judiciaries are being
liberated from the shackles of the imperial presidency, making it
possible for them to play their constitutional roles effectively.
1. The Right to Fair Administrative Action
A number of countries have now constititutionalized the right to fair
administrative action. This idea was first embraced by Namibia in 1990,
and has since been adopted by South Africa and Kenya. Namibia's
Constitution of 1990 provides that "[aidministrative bodies and
administrative officials shall act fairly and reasonably." 102 Further, the
South African 03 and Kenyan 0 4 Constitutions respectively provide that
"[e]veryone has the right to administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair." The inclusion of a similar provision in
Zimbabwe's draft Constitution suggests that the idea of fair
administrative action is gaining acceptance in other African
countries. 105
The idea behind this constitutional right is that the "[1legal
regulation of public power should include judicial review of
administrative action as well as a range of procedures and institutions
to ensure good governance."10 6 According to Hugh Corder, these
procedures and institutions include,
genuinely consultative and participatory rule-making
and decision-making procedures, accessible to the people
affected; . . . a duty upon those exercising all forms of
public power to give reasons for decisions . . . ; open
government, access to official information and the
minimisation of the scope of official secrets legislation;
maximum feasible access to administrative justice,
102. CONSTITUTION, art. 18 (1990) (Namib.).
103. S. AFR. CONST., art. 33, 1996.
104. CONSTITUTION, art. 47 (2010) (Kenya).
105. DRAFT CONSTITUTION, art. 4.18 (2012) (Zimb.).
106. Hugh Corder, Reinventing Administrative Law in South Africa, in SUNRISE OR
SUNSET?: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 100, 103 (Chris Finn ed., 2000).
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including class actions, a broad definition of legal
standing and the provision of adequate legal services;
[and] the training of public servants [and the public] in
the principles of good governance. 0 7
The extent to which the right to fair administrative action will
enhance the legal regulation of power in Africa will, among other things,
depend on the willingness of judiciaries to interpret the term
"administrative action" expansively. In an effort to ensure that courts do
not unreasonably interfere with policy-making and executive
decision-making, the South African Constitutional Court has drawn a
distinction between executive and administrative action, stating that it
would be reluctant to review the former.10 8 In President of the Republic
of South Africa v. South African Rugby Football Union (SARFU), for
example, the court held that the President's decision to appoint a
commission of inquiry to investigate the administration of rugby was
executive rather than administrative action.109 It reasoned that "[t]he
relevant power was political in character, akin to a prerogative power,
and it did not involve the implementation of legislation, which is the
hallmark of administrative action."110
Nevertheless, this interesting case raises the question of whether
executive action is, or should be, amenable to judicial review. Again, the
approach taken by the South African Constitutional Court is
instructive. In cases such as Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
of South Africa: In re Ex parte application President of the Republic of
South Africa, 1 ' and Fedsure Life Assurance v. Greater Johannesburg
Metropolitan Council,1 1 2 it has demonstrated willingness to subject
matters of "high-policy" and executive action to judicial review. In
Fedsure, it read Article 33(1) of the South African Constitution as
constitutionalizing the principle of legality, which in its view formed
part of the rule of law and expressed the idea that "the exercise of public
power is only legitimate where lawful."113 Also, in Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, the Court reasoned that the rule of law requires "that
107. Id.
108. See generally Cora Hoexter, The Principle of Legality in South African
Administrative Law, 4 MACQUARIE L.J. 165 (2004) (Austl.).
109. President of the Republic of S. Afr. v. S. Afr. Rugby Football Union 2000 (1) SA 1
(CC) (S. Mr.).
110. Hoexter, supra note 108, at 175.
111. See Pharm. Mfrs. Assn of S. Afr.: In re Ex parte Application President of the
Republic of S. Afr. 2000 (2) SDA 674 (CC) (S. Aft.).
112. See Fedsure Life Assurance v. Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metro. Council
1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) (S. Afr.).
113. Hoexter, supra note 108, at 181.
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the exercise of public power by the executive and other functionaries
should not be arbitrary. Decisions must be rationally related to the
purpose for which the power is given."114
The courts of other African countries should emulate this approach
by treating the rule of law as a foundational value of the constitutional
order. As Cora Hoexter has argued, the principle of legality, which
forms part of the rule of law, is "a wonderfully useful and flexible device
•.. [in the sense that it] acts as a kind of safety net, catching exercises
of public power that do not qualify as administrative action." 115 In her
view, this principle tells us "that all exercises of public power must
comply with standards such as lawfulness, reasonableness and
fairness."'1 6 Indeed, a number of the post-1990 African Constitutions
now make some reference to the rule of law. For example, Kenya's
Constitution recognizes "the aspirations of all Kenyans for a
government based on . . . the rule of law."117 Perhaps even more
important, this Constitution establishes the rule of law as one of the
"national values and principles of governance."1 8 It remains for the
courts to give it effect so that the exercise of public power in Kenya can
be regulated adequately.
It will also be necessary to educate "administrators as to their
duties under the law and of the public as to their rights vis a vis [sic]
the administration."1 1 9 In South Africa's case, it has long been proposed
that an Administrative Review Council should be established to
facilitate such education as part of its function of regulating the
implementation of statutes enacted to give effect to the right to fair
administrative action. 120 This function could also be performed by
ombudsmen, such as Kenya's Commission on Administrative Justice,
which has been established recently pursuant to requirements of the
new Constitution. 21
2. Social and Economic Rights
Another significant innovation is the constitutionalization of social
and economic rights in various countries, since it can facilitate the
114. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n of S. Afr.: In re Ex parte Application President of the Republic of
S. Afr. 2000 (2) SDA 674 (CC) at 67 para. 85 (S. Mr.).
115. Hoexter, supra note 108, at 183.
116. Id. at 185.
117. CONSTITUION, pmbl. (2010) (Kenya).
118. Id. art. 10.
119. Corder, supra note 106, at 108.
120. Id.
121. See The Commission on Administrative Justice Act, No. 23 (2011) (Kenya).
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attainment of social justice and thereby enhance the quality of
democracy in Africa. For example, the Constitution of South Africa of
1996 gives everyone the right to have access to adequate housing,
health care services, sufficient food and water, and social security. 122
Further, it requires the state to "take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation" of these rights. 123 In addition, the Constitution of Kenya of
2010 gives every person the rights to "the highest attainable standard of
health," accessible and adequate housing, reasonable standards of
sanitation, freedom from hunger, clean and safe water in adequate
quantities, and social security and education. 124 Although Kenya's
Constitution does not expressly impose obligations on the state to take
measures to ensure their realization, it nevertheless provides that
general rules of international law and treaties ratified by Kenya form
part of the law of Kenya. Therefore, it can be expected that courts will
require the executive to facilitate the progressive realization of social
and economic rights, as required by the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which Kenya has ratified.
These provisions on social and economic rights are buttressed by
provisions in the same Constitutions which guarantee all individuals
"the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities
in political, economic, cultural and social spheres." 125 Further, these
Constitutions mandate the state to establish affirmative action
programs designed to ensure that minorities and marginalized groups
are represented in governance. 26
If implemented, these constitutional prescriptions can facilitate the
realization of equality and inclusive citizenship. This would be a
particularly desirable result, as it would help to eradicate the political
manipulation of perceptions of marginalization and exclusion that have
often contributed to inter-ethnic and racial conflicts in much of Africa,
which have been exacerbated by globalization processes such as
privatization. Eradicating such perceptions would foster a sense of
nationhood without which meaningful democracy cannot thrive.
However, realizing the foregoing constitutional prescriptions is
likely to be a difficult task for two reasons. First, the Constitutions in
question, of which Kenya's is a good example, often do not provide
formulae for reconciling competing claims of discrimination. In the
absence of such formulae, a number of questions arise. For example, are
122. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 26-27.
123. Id. §27(2).
124. CONSTITUTION, art. 43 (2010) (Kenya).
125. Id. art. 27(3).
126. See, e.g., id. art. 56.
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claims of discrimination based on ethnicity and disability subordinate to
those based on gender? Further, how should governmental efforts to
redress the three categories of discrimination be reconciled? It cannot
plausibly be the case that one category of discrimination is more
deserving of resolution than the others. In fact, if we privilege one
category of discrimination, we risk undermining the legitimacy of its
resolution.
Second, depending on what approach the courts take regarding
claims of infringement on social and economic rights, they could either
be accused of usurpation or abdication. 127 One view holds that courts
lack the legitimacy and institutional competence to interfere with the
political branches' "conception and implementation of social and
economic policies on which individuals' enjoyment of health, education,
housing etc [sic] necessarily depend."128 According to an alternate view,
the fact that social and economic rights are expressly recognized in a
constitutional document as justiciable legal rights mandates that the
courts legitimately intrude into the domain of the political branches and
provide effective remedies for individuals whenever their rights are
violated. 129 If they fail to do so, it is argued that they would be
abdicating their constitutional responsibility.1 30
Administrative law can contribute to the resolution of both
difficulties. Administrative law principles such as "proportionality" can
contribute to the reconciliation of competing claims of discrimination. In
Kenya, for example, the Constitution mandates the Government to
establish affirmative action programs that will address discrimination
and exclusion on the basis of gender, disability, and ethnicity.1 31
Unfortunately, it fails to provide a formula for reconciling these
competing claims of discrimination. The principle of proportionality
could be instrumental in reconciling these claims. Additionally,
administrative principles such as "reasonableness" can contribute to the
realization of social and economic rights. In this respect, the approach of
South Africa's Constitutional Court is again instructive, even if it has
been accused of abdication by various commentators. 132 Its approach is
very much rooted in the methodology of administrative law. In
127. See, e.g., Octavio L. M. Ferraz, Between Usurpation and Abdication? The Right to
Health in the Courts of Brazil and South Africa, Soc. ScI. RES. NETWORK 20 (Aug. 20,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458299.
128. Id. at 1.
129. See id. at 3.
130. See id.
131. CONSTITUTION, art. 56 (2010) (Kenya).
132. See, e.g., Katharine G. Young, A Typology of Economic and Social Rights
Adjudication: Exploring the Catalytic Function of Judicial Review, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L.
385, 394 (2010).
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successive cases, 133 South Africa's Constitutional Court has adopted a
policy of evaluating the reasonableness of policies promulgated by the
government to facilitate the realization of social and economic rights.
For the Court to consider state measures reasonable, "they must aim at
the effective and expeditious progressive realisation of the right in
question, within the states [sic] available resources for
implementation."' 134 Further, "[t]he measures must be comprehensive,
coherent, inclusive, balance[d], flexible, transparent, be properly
conceived and properly implemented, and make short, medium and
long-term provision for those in desperate need or in crisis
situations."'135 In Government of the Republic of South Africa v.
Grootboom, for example, the Court held that the government's housing
program was unreasonable because it did not make reasonable
provision for those in desperate need of housing.136
A major advantage of this approach is that it facilitates the
democratization of the political decision-making process. Therefore, if
the views of any particular affected individuals or groups have not been
sought and included in the policy-making process, then the government
will be required to accommodate such interests and reconsider its policy.
The reasonableness approach can "place onerous demands on
government bodies."137 This approach ensures that the political
branches remain the primary locus of social and economic policy
decision-making, as they should, whilst the courts ensure that the
political process respects "the right of all citizens to equal participation
in the process of deliberation."' 38 This "democracy strengthening role"'139
of the courts would be particularly useful in Africa where the political
process is all too often "deaf to the voices and rights of some individuals
and groups in society."140 Further, this approach enables the courts to
133. See, e.g, Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S.
Afr.); Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.);
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. Aft.).
134. Lilian Chenwi, Putting Flesh on the Skeleton: South African Judicial Enforcement
of the Right to Adequate Housing of Those Subject to Evictions, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 105,
119 (2008).
135. Id.
136. Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 9 para. 11 (S.
Afr.).
137. Anashri Pillay, Reinventing Reasonableness: The Adjudication of Social and
Economic Rights in South Africa, India and the United Kingdom 3 (2011) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University College London) (on file with Faculty of Laws, University College
London Library).
138. Ferraz, supra note 127, at 17.
139. See SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND
POSITIVE DUTIES 100 (2008).
140. Ferraz, supra note 127, at 17.
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avoid undermining their legitimacy by attempting to resolve deeply
polycentric controversies concerning whose needs should "receive
priority over the competing needs of other individuals dependent on the
same scarce resources."
141
The South African courts have also adopted an unusual approach to
enforcing their orders in the context of social and economic rights. In
various cases, they have issued structural interdicts, which allow them
to participate in the implementation of their orders. 142 The structural
interdict, which can be traced back to school desegregation cases in the
United States, such as Brown v. Board of Education,143 seeks to achieve
structural institutional reforms as opposed to merely compensating for
past wrongs. 144 For example, if the problem is that the government, in
making a housing policy, has failed to take into account the views of
those in desperate need of housing (as in Grootboom), then the court
would issue a structural interdict requiring the government to indicate
the measures it would institute to address the problem, and delineating
how it would ensure the participation of the affected parties. Further,
the court could also ask the government to indicate timelines within
which it intends to address the problem. The structural interdict allows
the court to retain jurisdiction, and actively participate in enforcing its
orders.145 The retention of jurisdiction is important because it enables
the aggrieved parties to go back to the court for assistance should the
government fail to keep its promises.146 Indeed, it has enabled the South
African courts to bring the litigating parties together (as well as third
parties) so that they can resolve the problem at hand through
negotiation or mediation. 147
Given the existing levels of inequality in many African countries,
which have been exacerbated by globalization, the structural interdict
can be a particularly useful tool in ensuring that disadvantaged
individuals and groups enjoy the social and economic rights that have
been promised in many Constitutions. Invariably, such individuals and
groups do not have the resources to engage the government in court
battles. Therefore, it is important that when issues of social and
economic rights do reach the courts, they are fully litigated with a view
to finding lasting institutional solutions. As the South African cases
141. Id. at 9.
142. See Young, supra note 132.
143. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
144. See CHRISTOPHER MBAZIRA, LITIGATING SOCIo-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH
AFRICA: A CHOICE BETWEEN CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 176 (2009).
145. Id. at 176-77.
146. See id. at 181-83.
147. See id. at 183-84.
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demonstrate, the structural interdict facilitates such resolution by
ensuring that the courts remain engaged until the issue at hand is
resolved.148 It also facilitates the attainment of solutions that take into
account the views of those affected (or likely to be affected) by
governmental decision-making. In other words, the prevalence of
inequality means that the judge should not just be a neutral arbiter. On
the contrary, establishing the conditions under which democracy can
thrive entails, inter alia, active judicial management of disputes,
particularly those involving the realization of social and economic
rights. 149
3. Institutions of Horizontal Accountability
Guillermo O'Donnell has defined institutions of horizontal
accountability as "state agencies that are legally enabled and
empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that span
from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation
to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may
be qualified as unlawful."150 He argues that these institutions can only
be effective if they cooperate rather than "operate in isolation." 151 These
institutions enhance the quality of democracy. 152 Arguably, democracy is
not viable where they are absent or weak. 15 3 In my view, institutions of
horizontal accountability are now taking shape in many African
countries, even if their effectiveness continues to be undermined by an
authoritarian statutory order.
In the recent past, a number of African countries have established
regulatory agencies to facilitate the accountability of privatization
processes. The following analysis is based on the experience of the East
African countries of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. 54 In those
countries, various agencies have been established to regulate the
provision of privatized public functions such as water, sanitation, and
security. These three countries have also established human rights
148. See MBAZIRA, supra note 144, at 180-83.
149. See, e.g., Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) at
para. 36 (S. Afr.).
150. Guillermo O'Donnell, Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, in THE
SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACcOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 29, 38
(Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999).
151. Id. at 39.
152. See Larry Diamond et al., Introduction to THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES, supra note 150, at 1,2.
153. See id. at 2.
154. See generally Akech, supra note 50 (exploring the role of democracy in the process
of privatization in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania).
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institutions which function as additional oversight mechanisms insofar
as they have broad mandates to investigate and report on human rights
violations. All in all, the mechanisms adopted by these institutions are
largely progressive, even if these countries continue to embrace the
Westminster approach of ministerial control, which obliges the agencies
to work under the direction and control of the relevant minister.155 This
requirement often works to the detriment of the operational autonomy
of these agencies.
All too often, these agencies continue to lack autonomy from the
executive, which in many cases retains the unregulated power to
appoint and dismiss their members. In Nigeria, for example, President
Obasanjo used his powers of appointment and dismissal to stop his
bitter rival, Vice President Abubakar Atiku, from gaining the
nomination of the ruling party.156 The Independent National Electoral
Commission, which was "a virtual appendage of the presidency," issued
"politically motivated corruption indictments in order to disqualify
targeted candidates," such as Vice President Atiku. 157 Likewise,
anti-corruption authorities remain ineffective due to executive control
and a lack of political will to fight corruption.
Although democracy needs institutions of accountability, a question
arises as to how they are to be held to account. That is, who will guard
the guardians? This is the fundamental question posed by bureaucracy,
which is "typically insulated from state officials and the people," and
which can therefore be accused of being undemocratic. 158 Put differently,
how can citizens ensure that agencies of the executive are not only
effective, but also do not abuse their powers?
In this regard, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have made useful
legislative efforts to facilitate public scrutiny of the workings of these
agencies. Of the three countries, Tanzania has adopted the most
innovative measures to facilitate the democratic governance of
regulatory agencies. Tanzania has established Consumer Consultative
Councils and also requires the Energy and Water Regulatory Authority
to consult the public through an annual program. 159 Tanzania has also
done the most to ensure that the membership of regulatory commissions
such as the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance is
155. See AKECH, supra note 50.
156. Rotimi T. Suberu, Nigeria's Muddled Elections, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA:
PROGRESS AND RETREAT 121, 123 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 2d ed. 2010).
157. Id. at 124, 129.
158. Diamond et al., supra note 152, at 1, 3.
159. The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority Act, (2001) No. 11 § 30
(Tanz.). See also The Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority Act, (2003) No. 10 § 30
(establishing a Consumer Consultative Council).
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broadly representative of society. Here, members of the Commission are
appointed through a democratic process that is calculated to enhance
the legitimacy of the Commission in the eyes of the citizenry. 160 Kenya,
Uganda, and other African countries can learn much from Tanzania's
innovative experiments in deliberative democracy.
Although these developments in Tanzania are encouraging,
significant obstacles to meaningful public participation in the
decision-making processes of regulatory or administrative agencies
remain. Perhaps the most significant obstacle here is the fact that there
is no uniformity in the rule-making procedures of these agencies, the
effect of which is that the public often does not know when and how to
participate in agency decision-making. In Kenya, for example, different
agencies employ different procedures in their rule-making. The
governing statutes simply give the agencies or the government minister
to whom they are answerable, the power to make rules or regulations
"for the better carrying into effect of the provisions" of the statute. 16 1 In
the absence of a set of minimum standards that administrative agencies
can use, some agencies employ fairly elaborate procedures while others
simply do not care about public participation. To seal this public
participation gap, countries like Kenya can learn from South Africa's
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, which prescribes a set of
minimum standards that administrative agencies must meet to ensure
that their actions are procedurally fair.162 In the case of administrative
action affecting the public, for example, this act requires administrators
to hold a public inquiry, follow a notice and comment procedure, do
both, or follow a different procedure provided it is fair.163
However, the citizenry can only take advantage of expanded
democratic spaces if they are sufficiently resourced. It is in this respect
that legal empowerment initiatives become crucial. Regulatory
processes, which continue to proliferate in African countries, now
significantly affect the lives and liberties of citizens. Therefore, legal
empowerment initiatives that will enable the people to better interact
with regulatory agencies need to be formulated and implemented. Such
initiatives should include legal literacy training, legal assistance, and
public interest litigation. 164  In particular, the capacities of
160. The Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act (2001) No. 16 § 7.2
(Tanz.).
161. E.g., Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Act, (2011) No. 14 § 56.
162. Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (S. Afr.).
163. Id. at § 4(1).
164. LORENZO COTULA, LEGAL EMPOWERMENT FOR LOCAL RESOURCE CONTROL:
SECURING LOCAL RESOURCE RIGHTS WITHIN FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN AFRICA 22
(2007).
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disadvantaged and vulnerable groups need to be enhanced-by state
and non-governmental organizations-so that they can make better use
of the democratic spaces that the institutionalization of the right to
administrative justice (through the enactment of procedural fairness
standards) would create.1 65 While it can no doubt be expected that
getting such groups to participate meaningfully in regulatory discourses
will be fraught with challenges, deliberative democracy initiatives
elsewhere in the world demonstrate that the establishment of
participatory sphere institutions may greatly enhance the practice of
democracy.166
4. The Liberation of Legislatures and Judiciaries
Ongoing democratization initiatives have enhanced the autonomy of
African legislatures. 167 For example, a number of these legislatures have
been granted independence from the executive. 168 Joel D. Barkan
observes that a small number of African legislatures "have become real
players in the policy-making process and thus institutions of
countervailing power vis-A-vis the executive."169 Nevertheless, increased
autonomy will require increased accountability if these legislatures are
to contribute to the development of responsive governance. In this
respect, the experience of Kenya's legislature is instructive. Arguably,
Kenya's legislature is one of the most powerful on the continent
today.1 70 Unfortunately, "there are definite concerns that [this
legislature] is not sufficiently accountable, especially in the manner in
which legislators have exercised their 'collective powers' of
policymaking, legislating and overseeing the executive branch."171 Here,
"the absence of effective accountability mechanisms in the legislature
has produced two undesirable results."17 2
165. See id. at 44 (discussing the tools of legal empowerment).
166. See generally SPACES FOR CHANGE?: THE POLITICS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN
NEW DEMOCRATIC ARENAS (Andrea Cornwall & Vera Schattan Coelho eds., 2007) ("[T]his
book provides rich and compelling empirical case studies of the dynamics of democratic
participation, especially in relation to 'new democratic arenas' at the local level.").
167. E.g., Joel D. Barkan, African Legislatures and the 'Third Wave" of
Democratization, in LEGISLATIVE POWER IN EMERGING AFRICAN DEMOCRACIES, supra note
49, at 1, 1-2.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 2.
170. See, e.g., Joel D. Barkan & Fred Matiangi, Kenya's Tortuous Path to Successful
Legislative Development, in LEGISLATIVE POWER IN EMERGING AFRICAN DEMOCRACIES,
supra note 49, at 33.
171. Migai Akech, Abuse of Power and Corruption in Kenya: Will the New Constitution
Enhance Government Accountability?, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 341, 365 (2011).
172. Id.
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First, legislators are vulnerable to influence from special
interest groups, which jeopardizes the ability of the
legislature to safeguard the public interest. Second, the
legislature's ability to hold the executive accountable is
questionable because its committees, which form a
critical part of its arsenal of oversight instruments, often
consist of legislators against whom credible allegations of
corruption have been made, and who cannot therefore be
expected to be genuine champions of the public
interest.173
"In the recent past, the legislature has arguably been unduly
influenced by special interest groups in exercising its lawmaking power,
as the enactment of the Tobacco Control Act of 2007 illustrates." 174
"Furthermore, the legislature has not only enacted unconstitutional
laws .. .but has also failed to amend laws that have been declared
unconstitutional."' 175 These examples demonstrate that the legislature is
not only prone to the undue influence of special interest groups, but may
also be abusing its collective power. While it is to be expected that
different interest groups will legitimately lobby the legislature to enact
favorable policies and laws, there should be procedural mechanisms to
ensure that interest groups seeking specific legislative outcomes do not
subvert the public interest. "Such mechanisms include those that
regulate lobbying, conflicts of interest, misconduct, and even corruption
in the legislature."' 76 Unfortunately, these mechanisms have either
been deficient or absent altogether.
Allegations of corruption have also been leveled against the
Parliamentary Service Commission, which is the bureaucracy that
administers the Kenyan legislature. 77 Among other things, this body
provides services and facilities to ensure effective and efficient running
of the legislature. It has been accused of all manner of ills, including
"irregular tendering processes, . . . and irregular recruitment,
remuneration and promotion practices." 178 Such maladministration can
only be dealt with if the Parliamentary Service Commission is treated
173. Id.
174. Id. at 371.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Okiya Omtatah Okoiti, Why We Want the Parliamentary Service
Commission Scrapped, SUKUMA KENYA (Jan. 14, 2009, 3:29 PM),
http://sukumakenya.blogspot.com/2009/01/why-we-want-parliamentary-service.html.
178. E.g., Should the Parliamentary Service Commission be Disbanded?, MzALENDO
(Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.mzalendo.com2011/11/12/should-the-parliamentary-service-
commission-be-disbanded/.
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like any other administrative body by subjecting its administrative
action to judicial review and oversight by an ombudsman.
A similar approach should be adopted in regulating judicial power.
Although the liberation of Africa's judiciaries from executive domination
remains slow, a number of countries have made progress. In Kenya, for
example, the Constitution now establishes due process mechanisms to
ensure that the process of removing judges from office is transparent,
impartial, and fair. 179 In all likelihood, certainty in the exercise of the
power to dismiss judges will enhance security of tenure and
independence of judges. Further, this Constitution grants the judiciary
autonomy from the executive. 180 It also establishes an autonomous
Judicial Service Commission to "promote and facilitate the
independence and accountability of the judiciary and the efficient,
effective and transparent administration of justice."18 1 While securing
the decisional autonomy of judges and the independence of the judiciary
from external actors such as the executive is no doubt important,
Kenya's experience is arguably more useful in terms of how African
countries can handle factors internal to the judiciary that often
undermine the decisional independence of judges.
Throughout common law Africa, the Chief Justice, who is the head
of the judiciary, typically wields wide-ranging but unregulated
powers. 8 2 These immense powers include determining which judges
hear what cases, determining where litigants can file their cases,
supervising and disciplining judicial officers, allocating office space and
housing, supplying judicial officers with motor vehicles, transferring
judicial officers from one geographic station to another, and initiating
the process of removing judges.' 8 3 Because the exercise of these powers
is not usually circumscribed, it has often been abused to the detriment
of judicial independence and accountability. Thus, judges confronted
with these powers may be inclined to do the bidding of the Chief Justice.
Unsurprisingly, many judges quake in the presence of the Chief Justice.
Kenya's Constitution seeks to resolve this problem by dispersing
judicial authority. Although the Chief Justice remains the head of the
judiciary, the Constitution establishes three superior courts (in addition
179. CONSTITUTION, art. 168 (2010) (Kenya).
180. Id. art. 166.
181. Id. art. 172.
182. See, e.g., Migai Akech & Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Kenyan Courts and Politics of the
Rule of Law in the Post-Authoritarian State,18 E. AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTs. 357, 369
(2012).
183. See, e.g., REPUBLIC OF KENYA, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUD. REFORMS
61-62 (2010), available at
http://www.kenyalaw.orgDownloads/Final%20Report%/20of%2Othe%20Task%2OForce%20
on%20Judicial%20Reforms.pdf.
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to various subordinate courts): the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal,
and the High Court. 184 It also establishes the offices of Deputy Chief
Justice (as the deputy head of the judiciary) and Chief Registrar of the
Judiciary. The Chief Registrar of the Judiciary is the judiciary's chief
administrator and accounting officer pursuant to Article 161,185 and
administers the Judiciary Fund established by Article 173 to enhance
the financial autonomy of the judiciary. 186 It further provides that the
Chief Justice will preside over the Supreme Court, while the Court of
Appeal and the High Court will each be presided over by a judge, who
will be elected by the judges of these courts from among themselves
pursuant to Article 164.187 These provisions greatly curtail the powers of
the Chief Justice, thereby reducing his ability to undermine the
decisional independence of judges. In order to realize the potential of
these provisions, though, it will be necessary to formulate procedures for
their implementation so that the exercise of powers, such as allocating
cases, effecting transfers of judicial officers, and disciplining judicial
officers can be subjected to fair, certain, and democratic procedures.
Again, as in the case of the bureaucracy of the legislature, it will be
necessary to subject the administrative decisions of judicial councils
(such as Kenya's Judicial Service Commission) and bureaucracies (such
as Kenya's Office of the Chief Registrar of the Judiciary) to judicial
review and oversight by an ombudsman.
D. Regulating Private Power
African judiciaries have begun to scrutinize the exercise of private
power, particularly where private bodies exercise public functions. In
this regard, the South African courts are leading the way. In the case of
AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Micro Finance Regulatory Council, for
example, the South African Constitutional Court held that private
bodies must comply with principles of administrative justice when they
exercise administrative powers.188 The court responded to the question
of whether a private and voluntary body with the power to make rules
regulating the micro-loan industry exercised public power whenever it
made rules. The court reasoned that because the Council regulated in
the public interest and in the performance of a public duty, its decisions
and rules were subject to constitutional principles such as the principle
184. CONSTITUTION, arts. 163-65 (2010) (Kenya).
185. Id. art. 161(2)(b), (c).
186. Id. art. 173(1).
187. Id. arts. 163(1)(a), 164(2), 165(2).
188. AAA Invs. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. Micro Fin. Regulatory Council2006 (11) BCLR 1255
(CC) at para. 11 (S. Afr.).
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of legality.18 9 This is a progressive development that ought to be
emulated by other judiciaries, given the proliferation of privatization
initiatives in the continent.
African judiciaries should also consider regulating purely private
bodies that exercise de facto powers. This need arises especially in the
sporting arena where African athletes are increasingly subject to the
rules of transnational sports organizations and federations that govern
international sport. The International Football Federation (known as
FIFA), the International Cricket Council (ICC), and the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) are good examples. These organizations
largely operate outside the purview of national and international law,
and are governed by their rulebooks and Constitutions as autonomous
private entities.1 90
While membership in these organizations is voluntary, they
invariably monopolize their sports and athletes are thus compelled to
become members if they want to participate in the regulated sports.
Therefore, these organizations are extremely powerful and their
decisions "can have profound effects on the careers of players."'191 "For
instance, they can suspend or ban players from the sport, thereby
depriving them of a livelihood."192 While such power may be necessary
to ensure that the spirit of fair play prevails in sports, it is patently
capable of being abused. Unfortunately, when such power is abused, the
affected athletes are often at a dead end because national courts are
reluctant to intervene, interpreting their relationship as a private affair
governed by contract and outside the purview of public law. Further, the
only recourse these athletes usually have is to appeal to the Court of
Arbitration for Sport, which is based in Switzerland. This makes the
pursuit of justice an exceedingly expensive affair. Indeed, the fact that
this court does not have branches in Africa usually denies them access
to justice.
This is the fate that befell Maurice Odumbe, a star cricketer and
captain of Kenya's national cricket team in 2004.193 Odumbe was found
guilty in an investigation authorized by the ICC and conducted by the
Kenya Cricket Association (KCA) of having engaged in "inappropriate
conduct" with a bookmaker and was subsequently banned from the
189. Id. at para. 29.
190. See Ken Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, 2 ENT. L. 1, 3 (2003).
191. Id. at 1.
192. Migai Akech, The Maurice Odumbe Investigation and Judicial Review of the Power
of International Sports Organizations, 6 ENT. SPORTS L.J. (2008), available at
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/eslj/issues/volume6/number2/akech (using the case of Maurice
Odurbe to argue that the power of international governing bodies of sports should be
regulated by national courts).
193. Id.
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game for five years. 194 In an attempt to overturn this career-threatening
ban, Odumbe applied for judicial review. The High Court of Kenya
declined to entertain his application, reasoning that it would not issue
judicial review orders against the ICC and the KCA since they were not
"public bodies or persons performing public functions" and that his
remedies lay in private law as this was a contractual dispute. 195
In my view, however, judicial review provides an important tool for
the national regulation of the exercise of the power of such International
Sports Organizations (ISOs). National courts should not only intervene
where the power of ISOs has been exercised unreasonably, but also
where the rules and regulations of these organizations are
unreasonable. But courts should draw the parameters of intervention
carefully to ensure that they do not unduly interfere with the
management of sport. They should strive to intervene only where the
rules and regulations of ISOs are arbitrary, irrational, illegal, violate
general principles of law, or cause economic damage to individuals. In
addition, courts should intervene where ISOs interpret their rules and
regulations unreasonably or wrongly. ISOs should not be allowed to be
the sole interpreters of their rules and regulations. In the Odumbe case,
for instance, there was sufficient justification for the High Court of
Kenya to interfere with the decision of the ICC/KCA tribunal. The rule
Odumbe is alleged to have violated was not only unreasonable and
unduly punitive, but its application to the facts was equally
unreasonable. 1960ne can only hope that when similar cases arise in the
future African courts will be bold enough to intervene and stop private
transnational organizations from abusing their power.
III. CONCLUSION
It is important for public law, especially administrative law, to pay
attention to how globalization and domestic political processes interact.
This is because globalization processes such as privatization and the
growth of transnational modes of governance are characterized by the
exercise of immense power which often adversely impacts the liberties
and livelihoods of individuals who typically have no means of
participating in the exercise of such power or holding it to account. In
this respect, administrative law can be a useful instrument for
194. REPORT BY MR. JusTIcE AHMED EBRAHIM IN THE ENQUIRY RELATING TO MAURICE
ODUMBE 30-31 (2004), available atin.yimg.com/icccricket/pdfs/odumbe-report
aug2004.pdf.
195. Republic v. Kenya Cricket Ass'n, (2006), available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/
CaseSearch/view-preview.php?link=18430952626790132716501&words=.
196. See Akech, supra note 192, at para. 6.
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deepening democracy in African countries. Administrative law norms
such as legality, reasonableness, procedural fairness, and
proportionality can be used to regulate the exercise of both public and
private power. African countries, therefore, need to establish and
implement elaborate regimes of administrative law containing such
principles and procedures.
Although administrative law has been poorly regarded in the
governance frameworks of African countries, there have been
encouraging developments in the recent past that could enhance its role
in democratic governance. These developments include the
constitutionalization of the rule of law; the right to fair administrative
action and social and economic rights; and the establishment of
institutions of horizontal accountability such as ombudsmen, human
rights bodies, and anti-corruption bodies. In addition, legislatures and
judiciaries are being liberated from the shackles of the imperial
presidency. And some courts, such as South Africa's Constitutional
Court, are now more willing to regulate the exercise of private power.
First, the principle of legality, which forms part of the rule of law,
could facilitate judicial regulation of all kinds of power, including
executive and administrative action. Second, administrative law can
democratize political decision-making processes, thereby contributing to
the realization of equality and inclusive citizenship, without which
democracy cannot thrive. In this respect, African judiciaries can also
contribute to the attainment of meaningful democracy by engaging in
active judicial management, especially in cases involving the
enforcement of social and economic rights. Further, administrative law
principles such as proportionality can contribute to the reconciliation of
competing claims of discrimination (such as those based on ethnicity,
race, gender, or disability), which Constitutions such as those of Kenya
and South Africa seek to redress. Third, administrative law can
prescribe sets of minimum standards that administrative agencies,
under the watch of ombudsmen, should meet so as to ensure that their
actions are lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair. In doing so,
administrative law would enhance the accountability of these agencies.
Fourth, administrative law can contribute to the democratization of the
exercise of power within legislatures and judiciaries, thereby enhancing
their effectiveness and legitimacy as institutions of countervailing
power. Finally, administrative law can facilitate the regulation of de
facto private power, particularly the power of transnational
organizations that operate outside the purview of national and
international law.
Ultimately, the potential of administrative law to enhance
democracy in Africa should be tested through empirical research. There
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is a need to document the interactions that ordinary citizens have with
the exercise of public and private power, with a view to contributing to
policy and legislative initiatives that seek to empower citizens to
participate more effectively in democratic processes, and hold the
exercise of power to account. In addition, although democratization has
led to the establishment of institutions such as ombudsmen and judicial
review, there is no documentation of whether (or how) these institutions
are working. In any case, there has been no systematic study of the
impact of administrative law in general and judicial review in particular
on public administration. Accordingly, research on administrative law
in African countries could, inter alia: (a) assess the rule-making and
adjudication practices of governmental agencies with a view to
establishing the extent to which they adhere to the principles of
administrative law; (b) assess whether the public participate in the
decision-making processes of governmental agencies and whether there
are any obstacles to effective participation; and (c) assess whether, and
how, administrative agencies are accountable to the public for their
actions, including possible obstacles such as access to needed
information, and whether judicial review and the ombudsman have an
impact on the exercise of power. It is only through such empirical
research that we can confidently gauge how the ordinary citizen is
interacting with the processes of globalization.

